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Book Review
REAPPRAISING THE RESORT TO FORCE: INTERNATIONAL
LAW, JUSADBELLUMAND THE WAR ON TERROR, by
Lindsay Moir'
CHRISTOPHER S. WATERS 2
OBSERVERS OF DEVELOPMENTS in international law norms over the past decade

or so-specifically in the realm of jus ad bellum-have formed an impression
that the legal restraints on waging war have been loosened, particularly since
the catastrophic events of the morning of 11 September 2001 ("9/11"). This
period coincides with George W. Bush's tenure in the White House and the socalled War on Terror. While the full extent of the Bush government's actions
has yet to be determined, Moir argues that the widely held belief that 9/11 served
to loosen the restrictions on jus ad bellum-the established and recognised legal
bases for engaging in armed conflict with another nation-is not true. To prove
this, he provides a detailed examination of international and non-international
conflict since 9/11. In doing so, Moir is clear that he will not speculate on the
future of the United Nations, despite the organization's pivotal role in
controlling both state and non-state aggression.
The author sets out this short book in four compact and comprehensive
chapters. Moir begins his reappraisal of the resort to force by reviewing the state
ofjus ad bellum as of the morning of 9/11. This first chapter, entitled "General
Legal Framework 1945-2001: The UN Charter Paradigm and theJus ad Bellum,"
is a straightforward and useful refresher on the prohibition against the use of
force. Through a judicious and weighted use of case and treaty law, as well as
academic writing, Moir reviews the historical development of the prohibition
and the self-defence exception. He breaks down the exercise of self-defence into
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two recognized, but controversial, variations: anticipatory self-defence and selfdefence against non-state actors. The latter category necessarily includes an
analysis of the case law defining "armed attack," the legal threshold for the
exercise of national self-defence.
Moir then provides a detailed overview of self-defence based on the Charter
of the United Nations,' the role and authority of UN Security Council
Resolutions, and the distinct doctrine of anticipatory self-defence under
customary international law. The international community derives a key
statement of this doctrine, known as the Webster Formula, from the seminal
"Caroline Affair."' This Formula provides that anticipatory self-defence is
permissible in cases where the threat to one's own nation is "instant,
overwhelming, and leav[es] no choice of means, and no moment for
deliberation."'
Regarding the other form of self-defence-intervention in a sovereign state
harbouring an armed group that is threatening the intervening state-Moir
reviews the principles set out in a seminal international law decision, the Case
Concerning Military and Paramilitary Operations in and Against Nicaragua
(Nicaragua v. United States of America).6 This decision set the bar for the
exercise of self-defence fairly high by defining "armed attack" in such a way as
to exclude the provision of arms and minor border incursions as sufficient
grounds to legitimize armed intervention. According to Nicaragua, the
aggressor's acts must be of "such gravity to amount to (inter alia) an actual
armed attack conducted by regular forces of the state."' As Moir explains, the
decision has been criticized widely for limiting offended states' responses where
armed groups of non-state rebels may be equipped, trained, and prepared for
aggression in a-host state, and subsequently carry out low-level, incessant raids.
The Nicaraguacase, however, has been overtaken by events. The changes
in the nature of state versus non-state warfare allow non-state actors to operate
within a host or rogue state without reaching the threshold for their opponents
to legally justify an armed attack. As Moir correctly points out, the relatively
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recent rise in armed attacks by non-state actors has hardened the resolve of
the international community. He quotes Michael Schmitt's suggestion that
the international community has become "more tolerant of forceful responses
to terrorism."8
Moir also reviews the decision in The Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom
of Great Britain v. Albania),' which examined the interpretation of the
prohibition against the international use of force as set out in Article 2(4) of the
UN Charter.'" The case involved a situation where the armed forces of a
sovereign state crossed the boundary of another state but did so, arguably,
without "violating the territorial integrity" or "political independence"-the
precise wording of the prohibition in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter-ofthe
offended state." The debate revolved around the provision's interpretation: is it
an absolute prohibition or can a nation take aggressive action that does not
amount to a stated violation?
Chapter two is an examination of Operation Enduring Freedom, the 2001
armed incursion into Afghanistan by a US-led coalition. In this context, Moir
poses three fundamental questions that bear directly on the legitimacy of armed
intervention in self-defence: (1) Was there an armed attack on the United States?
(2) Was the response necessary? (3) Was the response proportionate? Through a
review of the case law and academic literature, Moir concludes that the 9/11
attacks met the standard of an "armed attack" under Article 51 of the UN
2
Difficulty arises, however, with regard to the distinction between
Charter.1
responses to an armed attack by Al-Qaida and responses to an armed attack by
the state of Afghanistan. Moir points out that, while the international
jurisprudence requires the United States to show attribution to the host state
for the acts of non-state actors originating from that host state's territory, state
practice is less clear.'" Nonetheless, immediately after the attacks, the UN
Security Council ("UNSC") adopted UNSC Resolution 1368, which explicitly
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references the inherent right of individual and collective self-defence.14 It also
acknowledges that the events of 9/11 were an armed attack, thereby legitimizing
the subsequent intervention. Having concluded that the events of 9/11 met the
threshold of an armed attack, the consequential requirements for the legitimate
exercise of self-defence-necessity and proportionality-were met by the
subsequent actions of the United States and its coalition partners.
Following the pattern set out in chapter two, chapter three uses Operation
Iraqi Freedom-the 2003 invasion of Iraq-as another example of the use of
armed force against a state. Here, Moir poses two different threshold questions:
(1) Was the action taken in self-defence? (2) Was the military action authorized
as a lawful response to the violation of the ceasefire agreement? While there was
widespread international support for the Afghanistan intervention, the criticism
of the Iraq invasion indicates that the international community conversely did
not accept the United States' justification for its use of force. Central to the Iraq
invasion was the 2002 US National Security Policy." Known colloquially as the
Bush Doctrine, the policy stated that the United States would resort to preemptive self-defence in the face of terrorist threats where and when it chose and
without awaiting an imminent threat to the nation. This doctrine has been
criticized as reaching well beyond its original application-that the United
States reserved the right to act pre-emptively against the threat of the use of
weapons of mass destruction by rogue states and their terrorist clients. The
declaration caused concern because it exceeded the limits set by the Caroline
Affair; the Bush Doctrine appeared to remove the requirement for an imminent
threat. However, Part V of the policy clearly enunciated that the traditional
indicia of imminent threat (mobilization of armies, navies, and air forces in
anticipation of invasion) needed to be re-cast in modern terms that reflected
the preparatory acts of terrorists."
Chapter four, the book's core chapter, builds on the author's previous
positions by reappraising whether there have been substantive changes in state
practice in the resort to the use of force by sovereign states. Moir begins the
analysis with several recent cases decided in the International Court of Justice
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("ICJ"). He uses the Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v.
United States ofAmerica)," the Case ConcerningArmed Activities on the Territory
of the Congo (DemocraticRepublic of the Congo v. Uganda), and the Advisory
Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory" to conclude that the court re-affirmed Nicaragua'snarrow
interpretation of the permissibility of the use of force in self-defence.
Interestingly, the Nicaragua principles' application to the Oil Platforms case drew
attention because the Iranian regular armed forces, not non-state actors, were
suspected of perpetrating the incident. Thus, it remains unclear whether the
threshold test for "armed attack" now applies to state actors as well as non-state
actors; Moir concludes, however, that the ICJ has not changed its jurisprudence
on anticipatory self-defence since 9/11, despite having an opportunity to adapt
to the changing face of international conflict.
Moir then turns to state practice, using Israeli operations in Lebanon and
Syria, the 2002 Russian strike against Chechen rebels in Georgia, and the 2006
Ethiopian military incursion into Somalia as contemporary examples. The
Ethiopian example is slightly off point, as the military intervention appears to
have been an effort to bolster the Somalian government rather. than a response
to a threat of armed attack by non-state actors from Somali territory. The Israeli
and Russian examples of self-defence, however, are properly on point. They
are both examples of actions taken in self-defence against non-state factions
harboured within another state. In particular, Israel claimed that Lebanon
and Syria not only harboured Hezbollah, but also provided the non-state armed
group with active support; 20 if so, Israel's action against both Hezbollah and
its host states did not vary from the Nicaragua standard. In summary, Moir
concludes that Operation Iraqi Freedom had no effect on the standard of
application of a "resort to force" because the widespread opposition to the
invasion demonstrates that state practice did not change. Accordingly, the
norms ofjus ad bellum remain unmodified.
In the final section of chapter four, Moir weaves the jurisprudence, states'
practices, and academic literature together to describe the contemporary state of
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jus ad bellum. The author highlights the limitations of the current state of the
law and canvasses the academic positions on events since 9/11. He reviews the
authors who posit that there has been both rapid change in the notion of state
responsibility for an armed attack and a general lowering of the necessary extent
of host state involvement that would trigger an armed response. Moir rejects
the notion that customary international law can be created instantly; instead,
he reviews relevant developments in international law (since the Afghanistan
intervention) to determine if there has been any impact on the right to
intervene-particularly as to what constitutes an "armed attack" and what level
of activity is required to trigger a response against non-state actors.
But what reasonable option is left to the victim state once the authority for
the use of force under the UN Charteror by UNSC resolution is removed and
the incidents are less grave than the justifiable threshold of intervention under
customary international law? Moir states that both common sense and realpolitik
dictate that military action may well be necessary against non-state actors, as
there is no reasonable or effective alternative to the use of force where their host
state is either unable or unwilling to take preventive action.22 So the analysis
returns to an examination of state practice. Moir quotes Gerry Simpson, who
states that "while the classic or traditional norms of collective security and selfdefence will continue to operate on the plane of sovereign equality, the unequal
sovereignty regime will predominate wherever there are other Great Powers or
outlaw states involved."23 Clearly, where the powerful states wish to use force
when their interests are threatened, international legal norms are severely
limited in their ability to curtail it. Indeed, there is no shortage of examples in
the post-9/1 1 era that could be applied to the analysis; but as Moir so ably
demonstrates, the book's key conclusion remains that none of the actions taken
by the United States (or any other state) since 9/11 have changed the principles
and thresholds of jus ad bellum.
In summary, this book is a thorough account of the international uses of
force that have occurred, in part, as a response to the 9/11 attacks. It is
logically constructed and its analyses are coherent. The one minor weakness in
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the author's argument, however, may lie in the lack of differentiation between
the relative weight of the ICJ jurisprudence, state practice, and UNSC
resolutions. It would have been valuable to the reader if Moir had assessed the
ICJ's reactions to the various uses of force since 9/11. The court passed up
.several opportunities to refresh the law of self-defence by updating the
Nicaragua case within the context of new methods of warfare. In addition,
Moir's reliance on predominately academic sources to explain state practice
could be improved by a detailed examination of states' actual words and deeds
and their importance in setting international humanitarian law norms.
This concise volume is part of the larger body of international law studies
and, in particular, the intersection of international relations and international
humanitarian law. More specifically, it is situated four-square in the body of
works examining jus ad bellum. Overall, Reappraising the Resort to Force is a
portable and digestible read for students of international law and international
relations alike. It has an outstanding and topical bibliography and is an
excellent addition to comprehensive studies in international law.

